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COPYING CHEAP NOVELTY ITEMS IS
NOT A NOVEL IDEA
[Copyright] is a force in life because it represents a liberty
for those who live under it. For liberty, as a force, presses persist-
ently within man, no matter what forces press against him from
without. The traitor to the human spirit may seek to bar it by
protective prejudices, but eventually, in the world-wide exchange
of ideas, it will move in. The world is always listening for it; is
always moving toward it; or away from a lack of it. There may
be dispute about the road to it: but there is no dispute about the
goal.'
The notion encompassed by the law of copyright that an author's
work, as a liberty, should be protected from infringement by others, was
first recognized in 1557 when King Philip and Queen Mary of Great
Britain granted a Charter for a Stationers' Company to "provide a suita-
ble remedy against the seditious and heretical books which were daily
printed and published."2
In the United States the framers of the Constitution also recognized
the necessity of a national system of copyright and so empowered Con-
gress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 3 In the United States, however, an
author's protections have derived from both federal copyright law and
state created causes of action against unfair competition, misrepresenta-
tion and defamation.
The Copyright Act of 19764 (the "Act") is the uniform federal law
governing the disposition of literary and artistic works. The statute im-
plements the copyright clause of the Constitution, the purpose of which
is to promote authorship through the grant of a limited-term monopoly
over literary and artistic works.5 The Constitution accords this monop-
1. Address by Bernard Grossman, Proceedings to Commemorate the 150th Anniversary of
the Napoleonic Code (April 30, 1954).
2. 31 C. BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS COMPANY 21 (1960).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1986).
5. "The Congress shall have Power... [to] promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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oly control in order to assure an economic return to the artist and en-
courage creation and dissemination.'
The Act has expanded the scope of federal protection of artistic
works and has enhanced an author's ability to invoke that protection.
Specifically, the Act was improved by eliminating most copyright formal-
ities7 and by clarifing the scope of the author's rights.' The validity of a
copyright is no longer dependent upon formalities such as notice, deposit
or registration; and failure to comply with them does not result in the
forfeiture of the author's rights.9 While the statutory protection has far
more clarity than the former copyright act,'o ambiguities still exist which
have led to inconsistent judgments in cases which are factually
analogous.
Section 106 of the Act defines the scope of the author's rights in the
work." It grants the author exclusive rights to reproduce, to prepare
derivative versions, to disseminate, to display and to perform publicly the
copyrighted work. The Act defines a derivative work as a work based on
one or more preexisting works.' 2 Examples of derivative works include
translations, cut reproductions or any form of work which may be recast,
6. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986).
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-12 (1986).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32 (1909).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986). Section 106 provides:
[t]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to author-
ize the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and pictoral, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
Id.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986). Section 101 defines a derivative work as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound record-
ing, cut reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or any other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship is a derivative work.
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transformed or adopted. 13 The statute further states, "a work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations or other modifications
which as a whole, represent an original work of authorship is a 'deriva-
tive work.' "" Derivative works are entitled to copyright protection
under the Act; yet, there are specific limitations on the copyright protec-
tion that such works will enjoy, as well as limitations on when they are
entitled to copyright protection.
In order to qualify for copyright protection, the derivative work
must add something original to the preexisting work. 5 The copyright in
the derivative work extends only to the original contributions by the au-
thor of the derivative work, as distinguished from the preexisting work.
The original changes or additions by the author of a derivative work
must meet the same standards for copyrightability as any other work.
16
While the law of copyright clearly extends protection to the original
expression of the work, the standard for copyright protection of deriva-
tive works is still imprecisely defined by the Act. As a result, the courts
have interpreted the standards for protection inconsistently, some enforc-
ing strict standards, while others are more lenient. In Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. "7 ("Peter Pan"), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals emphasized that the test for infringement is necessarily vague
because no bright line can be drawn as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the idea and has borrowed its expression, stating, "deci-
sions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."' 8 This imprecise standard
has led to difficulty determining when a derivative work is sufficiently
original to be eligible for copyright protection.
Another significant change made under the Act is a preemption sec-
tion which eliminates state rights equivalent to the rights under a copy-
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1986). Section 103(b) provides:
The copyright in a com'pilation of derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting mate-
rial employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or en-
large the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in
the preexisting material.
Id.
16. Id.
17. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). The court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction
forbidding the defendant from infringing the plaintiff's "Byzantium" cloth designs. The de-
signs were not identical, but were the same general color, and had similar symbols. Thus, the
ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities would be disposed to overlook
them and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same. Id. at 489.
18. Id.
1988]
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right, but preserves state rights against activities violating legal or
equitable "rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106. "19 Thus, with respect to works within the scope of the Act,
protection equivalent to copyright is governed exclusively by the Act and
state law that affords such protection is abrogated. The preemption sec-
tion has had a significant narrowing effect on state law actions in areas,
such as misappropriation or unfair competition.
PAST PLUTO: AN EXAMPLE OF AN UNORIGINAL DERIVATIVE WORK?
In Past Pluto Productions Corp. v. Dana20 ("Past Pluto"), the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, dis-
missed a copyright infringement action after it determined that plaintiff's
foam novelty hats based on the Statue of Liberty lacked sufficient origi-
nality to be copyrightable.2' At issue was the validity of a copyright.
Specifically, when is a derivative work22 a sufficiently original expression
of an idea to be copyrightable?
The plaintiff, Past Pluto Productions, brought an action seeking a
temporary injunction against the defendants, David L. Dana and Dana
International, under federal copyright law for the alleged infringement of
plaintiff's foam novelty hats.23 Plaintiff alleged that its novelty hat, the
"Crown of Liberty," had been copied by the creation of and manufacture
of the defendant's "Liberty Lid."24
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's case after concluding that
the transposition of the Statue of Liberty into the medium of flat foam
was not sufficiently original for copyright protection. 25 Although the
court found the copyright invalid, it still addressed the infringement is-
sues. According to the court, there was no proof of actual copying or
substantial similarity between the two products and thus, there was also
no infringement. The court did suggest that the plaintiff might have been
able to succeed on the theory of misappropriation, as the defendant had
19. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1986). Section 301(b)(3) provides in relevant part:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the com-
mon law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
Id.
20. 627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
21. Id. at 1443.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986). See supra note 9 for text of section 101.
23. Past Pluto, 627 F. Supp. at 1437.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1443.
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unfairly benefitted from Past Pluto's business advantage.26 The court,
however, did not advise the plaintiff on how to proceed on the misappro-
priation theory in light of federal copyright preemption of state created
causes of action.
The dispute which gave rise to the suit in Past Pluto began when the
plaintiff secured a copyright for its "Crown of Liberty," a foam novelty
hat depicting the crown of the Statue of Liberty. The hat was designed
and manufactured to memorialize the celebration of the Statue's centen-
nial and restoration.27
The defendant purchased five hundred crowns from Past Pluto on
consignment. After selling approximately one hundred and fifty of the
hats, he returned the others to Past Pluto. Dana then entered into nego-
tiations with Past Pluto for the purchase of five thousand hats for resale.
The business transaction was never consummated because Dana refused
to pay the price offered by Past Pluto. Instead, Dana decided to manu-
facture his own line of novelty hats.28
Soon after the negotiations between the two parties ended, Dana
prepared a sketch of a foam hat and contacted foam manufacturers.29
Dana first contacted the manufacturer who worked with Past Pluto, but
an agreement was never reached because the manufacturer refused to
make the foam the same color as that used by Past Pluto. Dana reached
an agreement with another foam manufacturer, Durafoam, for the manu-
facture of the hats in the same color foam as Past Pluto's. An artist was
then secured to complete the artwork for the crown's design. 30 Dana
began marketing his foam hat, the "Liberty Lid," in July of 1985. After
selling approximately 1,200 hats, he created a second version that varied
slightly from the first. On July 18, 1985, the United States Copyright
Office issued a certificate of copyright registration for Dana's "Liberty
Lid."31
The crown of the actual Statue of Liberty is a three-dimensional
coppercoated, iron framework sculpture. Seven spikes, non-uniform in
size, radiate from the crown and large vertical windows are depicted
26. Id. at 1445.
27. Id. at 1437. The Statue of Liberty was completed in France in 1884 by sculptor, Fre-
deric Auguste Bartholdi and was unveiled in America in 1886. In 1986, the year of the
Statue's centennial, a nation-wide fundraising drive was devoted to the restoration of the
Statue. Numerous entrepreneurs manufactured and sold Statue of Liberty memorabilia and
novelty items based on the Statue. Id.
28. Id. at 1438.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1439.
31. Id.
1988)
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above the spikes.3 2 The plaintiff's "Crown of Liberty," inspired by the
Statute of Liberty, was a soft planar sculpture, approximately three-
eighths of an inch thick, made of green foam. Seven evenly spaced spikes
radiated from the hat's perimeter. A circular hole cut in the foam ena-
bled the purchaser to wear it as a hat. A silk-screen design decorated the
hat beneath the spikes with the words, "Statute of Liberty 1886-1986,"
appearing below a series of window-like silhouettes. A copyright notice,
"© 1984 Past Pluto Productions Corp. N.Y. Pat. Pend.," was silk-
screened on the base of the hat.3 3
The defendant's "Liberty Lid" was made of approximately the same
type of foam and was approximately the same height, weight and color as
the plaintiff's hat. The silk-screen on the "Liberty Lid" had the word
"Liberty" and the dates "1886" and "1986" on the artwork beneath the
windows surrounded on either side by stars.34
The court stated that there are two necessary elements that must be
established in a copyright infringement case. The plaintiff must show
ownership of a valid copyright and copying by the defendant. 35 Because
Past Pluto had registered its "Liberty Lid" with the United States Copy-
right Office, there was prima facie evidence of the validity of the copy-
right. The defendant, however, was able to rebut that presumption.
3 6
In analyzing the validity of Past Pluto's copyright, the court stated
that a mass-produced derivative work is entitled to copyright protection,
but must be the author's original expression of his ideas.37 The copyright
only protects the original expression of the idea taken from the original
work. The copyright in a derivative work does not extend to the under-
lying work. Thus, a novelty item based on the Statue of Liberty is copy-
rightable only if the design is itself original.38
The court relied on the sufficient originality test, first expounded in
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder 31 ("L. Batlin"), to analyze the
32. Past Pluto, 627 F. Supp. at 1438.
33. Id. at 1437.
34. Id. at 1439.
35. Id. at 1440.
36. Id. The court stated that the validity of the copyright is merely an inference and can-
not be considered conclusive. The copyright certificate shifts the burden of proof to the de-
fendant to prove the validity of the copyright. Id.
37. Id. at 1441 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954)).
38. Id.
39. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.)(en banc) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976). An importer of
mechanical toy "Uncle Sam" banks brought an action to restrain an importer of similar banks
from importing the banks which he claimed infringed his copyright. The court held that the
plaintiff's copyright was invalid because it did not represent a substantial variation from the
original antique bank which had long been in the public domain. Id.
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copyrightability of the hat's design. In L. Batlin, the court held that to
support a copyright "[a]ll that is needed ... is that the 'author' contrib-
uted something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recog-
nizably his own."'  The standard can be applied very strictly if a court
chooses to do so, making it very difficult to succeed in an action for copy-
right infringement.
The Past Pluto court, in applying the L. Batlin "sufficient originality
test," seemed to adopt not only the court's strict standards, but also its
negative attitude towards inexpensively manufactured novelty items.
For instance, the Past Pluto court found that the design of the hat was
composed of elemental symmetry, which was most likely promoted by
convenience in manufacture.4 The court then found that there was
nothing copyrightable about the choice of green foam (as opposed to an-
other color) or the purely functional hole in the hat for the purchaser's
head. Also, the seven spikes of the plaintiff's crown were directly pro-
portional to the number of spikes of the actual Statue, and were therefore
not original, even though the spikes on the Statue are uniquely non-uni-
form in size. The court attributed that difference to simple ease of manu-
facturing and refused to consider it original. Next, the court stated that
the phrase "Statute of Liberty 1886-1986" on the crown was not unique
because it was historical data, clearly in the public domain. The court
concluded its analysis of sufficient originality by stating that the require-
ment of originality must be satisfied by demonstration of true artistic
skill, rather than the mere demonstration of physical skill or special
training."
In following this strict line of analysis, the court concluded that the
only aspect of the hat's design that could possibly qualify for copyright
protection was the silhouette design of its windows. The court found,
however, that the design was not copyrightable because, in the court's
view, anyone who created a hat based on the Statue of Liberty would
probably come up with a similar design. Also, the mechanical skill used
in its creation could not be equated with originality for the purpose of the
copyright law.43
The court observed that it was not required to go further in its anal-
ysis before dismissing the case. Because Past Pluto's copyright was inva-
lid for lack of originality, it was irrelevant whether the defendant had
40. Id. at 490.
41. Past Pluto, 627 F. Supp. at 1441.
42. Id. at 1443 (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.)(en
banc) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976)).
43. Id.
1988]
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copied Past Pluto's copyright. Nevertheless, the court chose to consider
the other necessary element of copyright infringement: copying." Ac-
cording to the court, even if there was a valid copyright, Past Pluto
would not be entitled to protection because there was no proof of
copying.45
In absence of direct proof, copying may be inferred where a plaintiff
establishes that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work, and
that substantial similarities exist between the works.46 It was undisputed
that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and the court recog-
nized that it would be impossible to find that the defendant did not pic-
ture the plaintiff's hat in describing the hat which he wanted
manufactured.47 Thus, the court chose to equate substantial similarity
between the two products as indirect proof of copying. That is, because
the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work, copying would be im-
plied if the two items were substantially similar.4"
The court stated that the proper test for determining whether the
items were substantially similar was the "ordinary observer test," fre-
quently used by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The test is
whether "an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."49 In Past Pluto,
however, the court never analyzed how an ordinary observer would view
the two works. Instead, the court applied the principle of "idea-expres-
sion unity," adopted in Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer
Electronics Corp.50 ("Atari") by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Atari, the court's analysis of substantial similarity focused on
whether a distinction could be made between the idea of the work and its
expression. When the idea and its expression are inseparable, copying
the expression will not be barred.5" The court stated that the copyright
laws only preclude appropriation of those elements that are protected by
the copyright. Thus, the analysis of the similarities must focus on only
the original aspects of the work. If the only similarity between the works
is the abstract idea, there is no substantial similarity and therefore no
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Past Pluto, 627 F. Supp. at 1443 (citing Walker v. Time Life Films, 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
47. Id. at 1438.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1443 (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir.
1977)).
50. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 808 (1982).
51. Atari, 672 F.2d at 616 (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d
738 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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infringement.5 2 In applying its idea-expression unity test, the court
stated that, "[t]here is no litmus paper test by which to apply the idea-
expression distinction; the determination is necessarily subjective." 3
In applying the idea-expression unity test adopted in Atari, the court
in Past Pluto based its determination of substantial similarity on the same
factors it employed to determine whether there was a valid copyright.
The court considered only whether there existed "limited modes of ex-
pression which [were] available, as a practical matter, to makers of flat
foam hats based on the Statue of Liberty,"5 4 and not whether an ordinary
observer would have found them to be similar. It looked at the cost of
the manufacturing process used and the level of skill used in creating the
design. The court found that manufacturers of novelty items have diffi-
culty in sustaining a claim for infringement because "an idea and its ex-
pression are more likely to coincide when an inexpensive manufacturing
process is used."5 5 The court stated that because an inexpensive manu-
facturing process was used, "any similarities between plaintiff's and de-
fendant's hats are most accurately viewed as an inevitable consequence,
rather than indicia of copying."5 6 The similarities between the works
could be viewed as a simple coincidence because there are limited forms
of expression when an inexpensive manufacturing process is used. Thus,
there was no indirect proof of copying.
ANALYSIS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE PAST PLUTO COPYRIGHT
The requirement of originality for a copyright is minimal. The law
does not require novelty;57 it requires only a modicum 8 of creativity. It
is required only that an author of a derivative work add to the preexisting
work.5 9 As long as the addition is original, the contributions should be
protectable, regardless of the character or status of the underlying work.
52. Id. at 616.
53. Id. at 615.
54. Past Pluto Productions Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 1444 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
55. Id. (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977)).
56. Id. (citing Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir.
1983)(per curiam)).
57. Baltimore Orioles Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 n.6
(7th Cir. 1986). The court in Baltimore stated, "[a] work is creative if it embodies some mod-
est amount of intellectual labor. A work is novel if it differs from existing works in some
relevant respect. For a work to be copyrightable, it must be original and creative, but need not
be novel." Id.
58. Id. at 669. The court stated, "[o]nly a modicum of creativity is required for a work to
be copyrightable." Id.
59. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936).
1988]
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Because the copyright laws require very little, whether a court finds
sufficient originality in a work is subjectively determined by the standard
or approach which is applied. The court in Past Pluto applied the strict
standard of originality articulated in L. Batlin. 60 In L. Batlin the court
held that an Uncle Sam bank was not sufficiently original, even after con-
sidering structural changes made by the author.6" The L. Batlin court
was influenced by the lack of sophistication and complexity of the work
and found the copyright invalid. A more recent case which strictly con-
strued the originality requirement was Gracen v. Bradford.62 In Gracen,
the court held that an oil painting of Dorothy, from the movie "Wizard
of Oz," was not sufficiently original even though the painting was not
based on any photographic still from the film and included background
and other artistic depictions not found in the film.63
Other courts have applied a far more liberal standard of originality
than the standard applied in Past Pluto. Under a more liberal standard,
the hat in Past Pluto may have qualified for copyright protection. Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. I is the most frequently cited expres-
sion of the liberal standard. The court in Alfred Bell was willing to find
sufficient originality as long as there was a "distinguishable variation"
between the derivative and the underlying work.65 The court recognized
a "distinguishable variation" if the author contributed something recog-
nizably his own.66
60. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d. Cir.)(en banc) cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976).
61. Id. at 492.
62. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). In Gracen, an artist who made a painting of Dorothy
from the movie "Wizard of Oz," submitted the painting to the copyright holder's licensee
pursuant to a competition for the contract rights to produce a series of the paintings to be used
on collectors' plates. The artist won the competition, but refused the contract and then dis-
played a photograph of the painting and other drawings to solicit artistic commissions. The
author brought suit against the copyright holder and licensee for the infringement of her subse-
quently obtained copyright in the painting. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging that the
artist's painting had infringed the copyright on the movie. The court of appeals held that the
artist's painting was not an original derivative work and was not copyrightable. Id. at 305.
63. Id.
64. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). In Bell the court held that the plaintiff's mezzotints (a
manner of engraving on copper or steel by working on a surface previously roughened with a
rocker or cradle and removing the roughness in places by burnishing to produce the requisite
light and shade) were sufficiently distinguishable from the paintings on which they were based
to entitle them to be copyrightable and that such copyrights had been infringed by the defend-
ant's photolithograph reproductions. The court held that constitutional and statutory provi-
sions relating to copyrights are satisfied if the author contributes something more than mere
trivial variation and may be copyrighted if there is something recognizably the author's own.
Id. at 103.
65. Id. at 102.
66. Id. at 103.
[Vol. 8
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
In Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger67 the plaintiff reproduced three-
dimensional works of art owned by several museums. Royalties were
paid to the museum for the privilege of reproducing the items. The
plaintiff created an eighteen and one-half inch "Hand Of God" sculpture
based on a Rodin bronze sculpture owned by the Carnegie Institute. The
court found that the sculpture was not an exact replica because it was
reduced in size from the original Rodin. Also, the rear side of the origi-
nal Rodin base was open, while the plaintiff's base was closed. The Alva
court concluded that the plaintiff was the owner of a valid copyright as
the reduction of the statue required originality.68
In American Greetings Corp. v. Kleintab Corp.,69 a manufacturer of
novelty items created a porcelain container with a depiction of a girl in
front of an oval mirror. The illustration had been first published by
American Greetings Corporation in a book six years earlier. When
American brought suit to enjoin the infringement of the design, the
American Greetings court found that the container was a copyrightable
derivative work because the inscription, "put on a happy face," which
had been added to the design, never appeared in the original work.7" The
court stated, "[w]ith this addition, plaintiff has created a derivative work
containing additional matter, making the later work distinguishable from
the underlying work alone. Such work is independently copyrightable as
a new and separate creation and no inscription concerning or reference to
the underlying copyrighted work need be made." '71
As these cases suggest, the various decisions regarding copyright-
ability of derivative works are irreconcilable. Courts presented with
analogous factual situations often come to opposite conclusions, depend-
ing upon whether a strict or a liberal standard of copyrightability is ap-
plied. It is impossible for any author of a derivative work to have
confidence in the validity of his or her copyright and to market a deriva-
tive product without fear of irrepressible copying.
In addition to adopting the stricter standard of copyrightability, the
court in Past Pluto was also influenced by the L. Batlin court's negative
view towards inexpensively manufactured novelty items. In Past Pluto,
the court suggested that because the plaintiff's foam novelty hats were
inexpensively created and manufactured, they were less likely to be copy-
rightable. While such reasoning has been applied by various courts, it is
67. 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
68. Id.
69. 400 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
70. Id. at 232.
71. Id.
1988]
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not mandated by the law. There is no requirement that the subject of a
valid copyright be expensive to create and manufacture. Rather, it has
long been accepted that the originality should not hinge upon the sophis-
tication of the claimant's work, as it did in Past Pluto. 
72
Based on the reasoning of L. Batlin, the court in Past Pluto may
have accurately determined that plaintiff's foam novelty hat was not suf-
ficiently original to be copyrightable. This result, however, could have
been obtained without considering that the item was a cheaply manufac-
tured novelty item. The tone of the case creates poor precedent for fu-
ture decisions where the works in dispute might be inexpensively
manufactured, but still original for the purposes of the copyright law.
The court's opinion leads one to believe that inexpensive novelty items
are not copyrightable. In Past Pluto, the plaintiff's copyright was not
invalid because it was an inexpensive novelty item. Rather, the hat was
not copyrightable because the design did not add enough to the preexist-
ing work to be considered original.
Past Pluto's hat was inexpensively created, but was still valuable as
the original expression of the artist. As Justice Holmes once declared, "if
... [certain works] command the interest of the public.., it would be
bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value-and
the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
73
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE Two WORKS
If the court had held that Past Pluto had a valid copyright, Past
Pluto would then have needed to prove copying. Copyright law places
the emphasis in an action for infringement on copying. Without copying,
there is no infringement.74 A number of courts have recognized that evi-
dence of access and substantial similarity between two works may raise
an inference of copying.
In Past Pluto, it was an undisputed fact that Dana had access to Past
Pluto's "Liberty Lid." In fact, Dana had expressed an interest in
purchasing the work in order to independently market it. 75 When a price
could not be reached, he created a hat of his own. Thus, substantial
similarity was the proper test to be applied to determine whether the
defendant had copied the expression of the plaintiff's work. The substan-
tial similarity test has taken on many different forms, including the ordi-
nary observer test, the idea-expression unity test and the test articulated
72. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
73. Id.
74. 2 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[A], at 8-22 (1978).
75. Past Pluto Productions Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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in Arnstein v. Porter76 ("Arnstein").
The first court to view substantial similarity from the eyes of the
ordinary observer was the court in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer. " The
court stated that, "[i]f we can see at first blush that there is such similar-
ity as would impress the ordinary observer, it is unnecessary to consider
the question of novelty or copyrightability of such similarities as exist."78
The Arnstein test requires a two-step approach.79 First, it is deter-
mined whether the defendant used the plaintiff's work in creating the
alleged copy. This step is analyzed according to whether the defendant
had access to the work and whether there are similarities between the
works. Second, it must be determined whether the defendant copied the
expression of the idea or only the idea itself. If the expression of the idea
was copied, there is infringement.
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp.,8 °
the court revised the A rnstein test. The first step was modified so that the
question became whether the ideas of the copyrighted work resembled
those in the alleged copy. If the ideas are determined to be the same,
only then is the second step of the Arnstein test applied.
Historically, the most frequently applied test of substantial similar-
ity has been the ordinary observer test. In Peter Pan, the court granted a
preliminary injunction forbidding the defendant from infringing the
plaintiff's copyright."' The court was one of the first to apply an ordi-
nary observer standard. The patterns of the two designs in question in
Peter Pan were not identical, but in applying an ordinary observer stan-
dard, the court found infringement. The court stated, "[t]he ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities would be disposed to
76. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
77. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933). Plaintiff sought to enjoin the exhibition of a silent photoplay
entitled, "The Freshman," and to recover all profits derived from its exhibition on the ground
that the photoplay infringed the copyright of a story written by H.C. Witner, entitled "The
Emancipation of Rodney." In holding that there was no infringement, the court stated that
the question involved in the comparison of a copyrighted story and alleged infringing play, to
determine whether one is a copy of the other, is the effect of the play on the public or the
average reasonable man who sees the play soon after reading the story. Id. at 18.
78. Id. at 28.
79. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
80. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). Sid and Marty Krofft, the creators of the H. R. Pufn-
stuf children's television show, brought an action for infringement of the show by the produc-
tion of the defendants' "McDonaldland television commercials." In finding that the plaintiff's
copyright had been infringed, the court held that the test for copyright infringement had been
given a new dimension; there must be ownership of the copyright and access to the copy-
righted work, but there must also be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of
the expressions as well. Id. at 1164.
81. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
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overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." 2 The
court found that that level of similarity was enough to find that the plain-
tiff's copyright had been infringed.
In applying the ordinary observer test to the facts of Past Pluto, the
similarities between the two works seem overwhelming. They were ap-
proximately the same size, weight and color, and were made of similar
material. Also, both had window-like silhouette designs and a hole cut in
the foam to enable the purchaser to wear the design as a hat. Because of
the many similarities, if the court had analyzed the hat from the ordinary
observer perspective, rather than simply reapplying standards such as ex-
pense of the product and difficulty of design and manufacture, it might
have found the products to be substantially similar.
The application of the idea-expression unity test, adopted in Atari, 3
did not preclude a finding of substantial similarity. In Atari, the copy-
right owners of an audiovisual game, entitled, "Pac Man," brought an
action for infringement against a competitor who had created and mar-
keted a similar maze-chase game. The court found that while the audio-
visual work was primarily unprotectible, the copyright owner was
entitled to a preliminary injunction because the alleged infringer adopted
the same basic characters and portrayed them in a manner which made
them appear substantially similar to the copyrighted work. The court
noted that many aspects of the copyrighted work were commonly used
devices in maze-chase games and were not entitled to protection.
In applying the idea-expression unity test, the court in Past Pluto
found that because an inexpensive manufacturing process was used, Past
Pluto would have difficulty in sustaining a cause of action for infringe-
ment. That does not mean that it is impossible to find infringement. It is
possible that the idea of Statue of Liberty hats could be created in many
different ways. For example, every person who created a Statue of Lib-
erty hat would not have included a silhouette of windows in the design.
If there are several different ways an idea might be expressed and the
expression of the idea was substantially similar in both works, a court
could conclude that an infringement occurred, as the court did in Atari,
regardless of the cost of the work.
Do NOVELTY ITEM MANUFACTURERS HAVE OTHER REMEDIES?
In Past Pluto, the court stated that the plaintiff might have been able
82. Id. at 489.
83. Atari Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 808 (1982).
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to succeed on a theory of misappropriation, rather than copyright in-
fringement. The court did not, however, indicate or analyze how the
plaintiff would prevail on this theory in light of the federal preemption of
state created remedies encompassed in the copyright law.
Misappropriation is a state law remedy and is a branch of unfair
competition.8 4 Generally, the tort of misappropriation protects against
the competitive use of a valuable product or idea by the creator through
the investment of time, effort, money and expertise." "It is a fact ori-
ented action, providing relief from all types of commercial
immorality."
86
When Congress revised the United States copyright law in 1976, it
specifically provided for preemption of all state law rights equivalent to
those within the scope of federal copyright law. 7 The authors of the
legislation stated that "[a]s long as a work fits within the general subject
matter categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the states
from protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright
because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify . '... ""8 A
state law action, however, covering "subject matter that does not come
within the subject matter of copyright as defined by sections 102 and 103
of the act isn't preempted by [section] 301."89 Thus, in order to succeed
on a theory of misappropriation, the plaintiff must show that the subject
matter of the action does not fall under federal copyright law.
In Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, 90 an artist brought an action
for conversion and misappropriation, alleging that Wedgewood had cop-
ied one of her snowflake designs. The plaintiff's snowflake designs had
been sold to museums and art houses. The works were not registered
with the United States Copyright Office, although there was a copyright
notice affixed to some of the designs.9'
The plaintiff met with a representative of United Nations Children
Fund ("UNICEF"), who agreed that the plaintiff's design would be used
in a Christmas card to be issued by UNICEF. The plaintiff then con-
tacted Mr. Polk, President of Latama, Incorporated, a plate manufac-
turer in an effort to have the snowflake manufactured into a Christmas
84. See generally R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES (3d ed. 1968).
85. Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. Id. at 1534.
87. Id. at 1531.
88. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976).
89. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1531.
90. 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
91. Id. at 1526.
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plate. Mr. Polk approached Mr. Fulks, Vice President of Marketing of
JWS Incorporated. JWS then contacted JWS Limited, which manufac-
tured all of Wedgewood's china. Soon after the plaintiff was informed by
Wedgewood that the plan was infeasible, she discovered the snowflake
design on a Wedgewood ornament. Wedgewood claimed that the design
had been created in Wedgewood's design studio.92
The court in Mayer found that in order to succeed on a theory of
misappropriation, the claim must meet an "extra element test."93 The
extra element must be one which changes the nature of the action so that
it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. "Ele-
ments such as awareness and intent, which alter the action's scope but
not its nature, will not save it from preemption under [section] 301.""
The issue in Mayer was then whether the conversion and misappropria-
tion claims contained an extra element which qualitatively distinguished
the actions and their underlying rights from those addressed by copy-
right law.
In Mayer, the plaintiff asserted that the extra element of commercial
immorality would save the action from preemption under section 301.
The court did not find that commercial immorality was an extra element.
Indeed, the court stated "[t]hat is precisely the type of misconduct the
copyright laws are designed to guard against."95 Elements which alter
the scope of the action, but not its nature, such as awareness and intent,
do not add an additional element for purposes of the test. Thus, the
cause of action asserted in Mayer was not qualitatively different from one
for copyright infringement.
In Past Pluto, the plaintiff would have had difficulty in sustaining a
cause of action for misappropriation. Derivative works are specifically
provided for in section 103 of the Copyright Act.9 6 Unless the plaintiff
92. Id. at 1527.
93. Id. at 1535.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1986). Section 103 provides:
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compi-
lation and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material
in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the ma-
terial contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preex-
isting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in
the preexisting material.
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could assert an "extra element," which would distinguish the action and
the underlying right of the action from those addressed by copyright law,
the action, in all likelihood, would be preempted.
CONCLUSION
It appears that entrepreneurs who manufacture novelty items can
never be sure that they have a valid copyright and can be sure that they
are not guaranteed any other protection under the law. Such uncertainty
encourages others to copy artwork in the hope that a court will find that
the plaintiff did not have a valid copyright. The copyright law should
clearly articulate standards of originality for derivative works that may
be consistently applied so that manufacturers will be able to rely on the
copyright protection provided for them by the law. Those standards
should not provide that inexpensively manufactured items are less wor-
thy of copyright protection.
Lyne A. Richardson
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